Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 (DCS, G-1) directed ARI to determine, based on an examination of a newly accessed Soldier granted religious accommodations (uniform/grooming standards), the effect of specific religious accommodations (RA) on: (a) attaining individual Soldier skill/task proficiency, (b) individual health and safety, and ( c) unit cohesion, morale, good order and discipline in Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Case study began upon Soldier's arrival at BCT on 2 September 2010, and concluded upon his graduation from AIT on 1 April 2011.
Procedure:
The U. S. Army Research Institute (ARI) researchers observed transition events in the Reception Battalion and training events previously selected by the DCS, G-1 and the U.S. Am1y Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Deputy Commanding General (DCG) -Initial Military Training (IMT) throughout BCT and at the end of AJT. ARI also interviewed BCT and AIT company command teams, administered a unit cohesion and morale survey to the BCT and AIT companies near end-of-cycle, and conducted small group interviews with BCT Drill Sergeants, senior AIT Platoon Sergeants (PSGs), AIT academic instructors, and Soldiers from the identified training companies' Platoons. IA W the approved plan, ARI did not directly observe in-processing or training events during the majority of AIT However, a researcher observed the Religious Accommodation (RA) Soldier during the final week of the capstone field exercise at Camp Bullis at the invitation of the 232nd Medical (MED) Battalion (BN) Commander (CDR). Perfon11ance, injury/illness, disciplinary data was collected directly from the RA Soldier's company command teams. Additional data was collected and analyzed from ARI' s ongoing Tier 1 Performance Screening Initial Operational Test and Evaluation project. Researchers also interviewed two Sikh offi cers, who previously completed training at Fort Sam Houston, about their experiences and lessons learned regarding approved RA Finally, the RA Soldier was interviewed prior to his graduation from AIT after all small group interviews were completed.
Findings:
Soldier skill/task proficiency. No overt differences were noted in the interactions between the RA Soldier and other Soldiers, cadre, or staff during observations of BCT. The RA Soldier was one of 156/183 Soldiers to graduate from his BCT company. The 14% attrition rate was consistent with previous rates within this training BN. The Soldier's performance during observed events and key graduation milestones, e.g. record fire and Army physical fitness test (APFT), seemed unaffected by the RA Researchers noted but were unable to determine if the Soldier's observed hesitancy to aggressively participate in combatives was due to his RA or personal preference. Although this hesitancy was also exhibited by other Soldiers observed during combatives training, the Soldier's concerns were further explored during his interview at the end of AIT.
Health and safety. Based on training observations and information provided by the unit, the Soldier's RA had no significant impact on his own, or any other Soldier's, health and safety. The Soldier was able to prepare for each day in accordance with the approved accommodations in the same amount of time as his peers under both barracks and field conditions. Unit cohesion. morale. good order and discipline. Reception and BCT BDE, BN, and company leaders were proactive in infonning all personnel of the upcoming RA. This action seemed to facilitate an understanding of the religious accommodation among Soldiers and cadre for ease of assimilation into the unit. Per BN directives, the BCT company CDR met with the Soldier on, at first, a bi-weekly basis to verify his accommodations were being fu l fille . d and to identify any potential issnes. Based on training observations, information provided by the unit, interviews, and analysis of data gathered by an ARI developed Platoon Cohesion and Morale index, the Soldier's RA had did not have a significant impact on unit morale, cohesion, good order, and discipline.
A Drill Sergeant was disciplined in part for derogatory comments made regarding the Soldier's RA during a haircut formation. Following this incident, the company CDR met with the Soldier on a weekly basis until the completion of BCT. No other disciplinary actions directly or indirectly related to his RA were reported.
Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:
Results of this effort were provided to the DCS, G-1 in July 20 l l. According to a letter (26 Jan 09) to the then Secretary of Defense, Dr. Robert Graves, the Executive Director and the Legal Director of the Sikh Coalition pointed out that Sikhs' external uniform " ... unify and bind them to the beliefs of the religion ... " and " ... remind them of their commitment to Sil<l1 teachings ... " (pg 3). As such, they emphasized that uncut hair (kesh) and turbans are key articles of faith and central to a Sikh's identity. They also pointed out that Sikhs proudly served in the U.S. military until a change in policy in 1981 prohibited exemptions to the uniform requirements for visible articles of faith. They cited examples of previous exceptions that showed the turban, hair, and beard requirements of Sikhism did not impede the perforn1ance of military duties.
Based on the merits of his appeal, the DCS, G-1 granted the requesting Soldier a religious accommodation to wear a turban, beard, and unshorn hair as an exception to AR 600-20 and AR 670-1. In addition to emphasizing that he had to be held to the same standards as other Soldiers for all aspects of training, the Memorandum (30 August 2010) indicated the Religious Accommodation (RA) Soldier 1 was allowed to wear religious headgear while in uniform, if the headgear met these conditions:
• Turban will be subdued in color (black)
• Authorized to wear the Army flash with pin on Distinctive Unit Insignia centered on his headgear. No other writing, symbols, or picture are authorized.
• His headgear must be of a style and size that does not interfere with the wear or proper functioning of protective clothing and equipment.
1 Although the authors recognize that the uniqueness of this individual case and the level of public 1nedia attention focused on the Soldier throughout his initial inilitary training inake it exceedingly difficult to protect the individual's identity, the reference "RA Soldier" is used throughout this report whenever original references identified the Soldier by na1ne in order to provide as 1nuch protection of the Soldier's identity as possible.
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• Authorized to wear a black turban in garrison and will wear the under turban in the field, during physical training, or in a deployed enviromnent.
• The under turban will be subdued in color (black to match the Army Combat Unifonn) and size will allow for the wear of the Kevlar helmet or the U.S. Advanced Anny Combat Helmet (ACH).
• If tbc under turban does not allow for the wear of the Kevlar helmet or the ACH, he will be required to remove the under turban when the Kevlar helmet or ACH is worn.
• The Soldier will provide the turban and under turban.
Similarly, the Soldier's accommodation to wear a beard and unshorn hair prescribed that it be neat and well maintained, as well as:
• His beard will be rolled and tied to a length not to exceed 2 inches while in garrison.
• His beard will be rolled and tied to a length not to exceed I inch while in the field, during physical training, or in a deployed environment.
• His hair will not fall over the ears, eyebrows, or touch the collar of his unifom1s.
Technical Objectives
The intent of this DCS, G-1 directed effort was to conduct a case study of this newly accessed Soldier who had been granted religious accommodations for Sikhism to detennine the effect of the approved religious accommodations on:
• The RA Soldier's ability to attain prescribed skill and task proficiencies ARI researchers did not conduct any direct observations of in-processing or training events during the majority of AIT, per the DCS, G-1 and DCG-IMT approved research plan. Performance, injury, illness, and disciplinary data were collected directly from the AIT Company command team. However, at the invitation of the 232nd Medical (MED) Battalion (BN) Commander (CDR), researchers observed the RA Soldier participating in the capstone field exercise at Camp Bullis, TX. These observations were conducted during the final week of the field exercise and allowed researchers to observe the RA Soldier interacting with his fellow Soldiers and cadre under various field conditions. ARI researchers also interviewed BCT and AIT company command teams, administered a unit cohesion and morale questionnaire (Appendix A) to the BCT and AIT companies near the end-of-cycle, and conducted small group interviews with BCT Drill Sergeants, senior AIT Platoon Sergeants (PSGs), AIT academic instructors, and Soldiers from the identified training companies' Platoons. Additional data was collected and analyzed from ARl's ongoing Tier 1 Perfonnance Screening Initial Operational Test and Evaluation project. ARI also interviewed two Sikh officers who previously completed training at Fort Sam Houston, about their experiences and lessons learned regarding approved RA. Finally, ARI interviewed the RA Soldier prior to his graduation from AIT after all small group interviews were completed.
Measures
Cohesion and Morale: A measure of unit cohesion was adapted for use in the BCT/AIT environment from an existing instrument used in previous ARI research (Mae!, 1989; Siebold, 2007; A. Hunter-DeCostanza, Personal Communication, 8 September 2010) . A measure of morale was developed by the research team to capture BCT/AIT Soldiers' beliefs about the positive significance of their decision to join the Army as well as the impact they believe the decision has had on their current self-concept, personal growth (in training), sense of purpose, and future career opportunities (beyond training).
Tier 1 Performance Screening Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (Tier 1):
Beginning in May 2009, the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAP AS), a non cognitive test, has been administered to all Tier 1 Non-Prior Service (NPS) applicants testing on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) at Military Entrancing Processing Stations (MEPS). Findings demonstrate that ARI's non-cognitive measures add to the capability of the ASVAB and high school diploma for predicting "can do" perfmmance (e.g., course grades, job knowledge test scores), "will do" performance (e.g., teamwork, Army physical fitness test (APFT), disciplinary incidents), continuance intentions, and attrition. command limitations placed upon the type of data that could be collected and analyzed during this effort, no demographic data were collected.
Data Analysis Overview
Standard psychometric procedures were used to determine if the items used on our questionnaires were combining to measure a coherent underlying idea (such as morale or cohesion) and were doing so in a way that would enable us to calculate an internally consistent index. The instruments were found to be very good to excellent according to common scientific/statistical standards. After establishing that our measures were reliable, we moved on to in-depth analyses of the data. The data were analyzed using univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) followed by Bonferroni post-hoc tests to identify statistically significant differences between platoons.
Results

Platoon Cohesion am! Morale Questionnaire
A standard Likert style scale with response options from Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree or Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree was used (see Appendix A). Examining the data from the Cohesion and Morale questionnaire administered during BCT, the reliability for the Cohesion index (13 items) was a=.85, and for the Morale index (14 items), a=.83. The measures were found to be internally consistent. Univariate ANOV As were conducted for both the Cohesion and Morale indices. Differences in average scores between companies were examined using Bonferroni post-hoc tests. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table l . The RA Soldier was assigned to 4th Platoon (PLT). While a significant difference in scores was noted in the Cohesion Index [F(2, 157) = 7. 71, p < .001 ], it was 3rd PLT that differed significantly from 2nd PLT and 4th PL I. There were no significant differences in Cohesion 4 FOUO between 2 nd and 4 111 PLTs. There were no significant differences in morale noted between the three PL Is, F(2, 157) = .88, p = .42. We concluded that the overall results from our BCT tailored cohesion and morale indices provided no evidence that the approved religious accommodations bad any significant impact on the morale and cohesion of the RA Soldier's PLT (4 'h ) compared to the two other PL Ts in his training Company.
Examining the data collected using the Cohesion and Morale questionnaire in AIT, the reliability for the Cohesion Index was a=.90 (13 items), and for the Morale Index, reliability was a=.91 (14 items). The terminology used on a few items was changed to reflect differences between the BCT and AIT training environments. Otherwise, the instruments used for BCT and AIT data collections were equivalent. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the AIT data collection. Table 2 . Average Scores on the Cohesion and Morale Indices by AIT Platoon Excluding 7th PLT (10 Soldiers in injury, hold over, or chapter status) from the analysis, the overall model for Cohesion [F(5,325)=4.12,p=.001) and for Morale [F(5,325)=2.24, p=.05] were still significant. Bonferroni post-hoc indicated a difference in Cohesion for 3rd PLT as compared to 4th PLT and to 5th PLT. There was a marginally significant difference (p=.051) for 3rd PLT compared to 2nd PLT. There were no significant differences among the other Platoons for Cohesion. For morale, the post-hoc test by Platoon indicated a significant difference only for 3rd PLT compared to 5th PLT. No other comparisons among Platoons were significant. The overall results from our AIT tailored Cohesion and Morale indexes provided no evidence that the religious accommodations had any significant adverse effect on the morale and cohesion of the Soldier's PLT (4t h ) compared to the other PL Ts in his training Company. Excluding 7 1h PLT, 3 rd PLT had the lowest average levels of cohesion and morale as measured by our indices.
Tier ] Performance Screening Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (Tier 1)
To examine the effect of religious accommodation on performance, Soldier responses to the Army Life Questiom1aire (ALQ) and supervisor ratings of performance were examined at the A!T Platoon Ievel. 2 Three Platoons were excluded from analysis due to invariant responding (all items rated '6,' insufficient sample (n=3), or a Platoon of Soldiers in holdover/hold-under status.) Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) yielded an inconsistent pattern of findings regarding Platoon performance differences. That is, while results showed significant differences between the Platoon of interest (i.e. 4 th PLT) and other comparison groups, these findings were inconsistent across performance domains. Bonfcrroni post-hoc tests comparing scores on the Performance Rating Scales across platoons indicated that 4 th PLT scored significantly below the average of all other Platoons on 3 out of the 9 scales (see Table 3 ). As indicated in Table 3 , there appear to be consistent differences when comparing ratings of 4 th PLT to the remaining Platoons. Some of the stronger differences are found in: Data were also collected using the Anny Life Questionnaire (ALQ), which measured factors such as affective c01mnitment, reenlistment intentions, and attrition cognition, among other variables. A complete set of reliable data were available for analysis, so 1 s t through 6 th PL Ts were compared on each of the ALQ factors. The averages for each PLT are presented in Table 4 . Table 4 . 4 th PLT did not significantly differ from any other PL Ts on the Affective Commitment measure. However, we found that 4 th PLT was significantly higher on Nonnative Commitment compared to 1 st and 2 n d PLT, and indicated no significant differences with the remaining PL Ts. 4 'h PLT had significantly lower Attrition Cognition than did 1st and 2 n d PLTs, and did not differ from the remaining PLTs on this measure. On Anny Life Adjustment, 4 th PLT scored significantly higher than 2 n d PLT, and exhibited no other significant differences compared to the remaining PL Ts. Again 4 'h PLT scored sit,'11 ificantly higher on Anny Civilian Comparison when compared to 1st and 2 n d PLT, but was no different from the remaining PL Ts. Finally, with respect to the Needs/Supplies Army Fit measure, 4 t h PLT again scored higher than l st and 2 n d PLT, but did not differ from the remaining PL Ts.
Discussion
Based on analyses of data collected during this single case study, the identified RA did not have a significant impact on mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, morale, discipline, safety, and health. Despite some negative reactions by personnel outside the units, unit leaders and personnel seemed able to assimilate the approved accommodations into their training environment without altering prescribed training requirements and standards.
a. Soldier skill/task proficiency: No significant overt differences were reported in the interactions between the RA Soldier and other Soldiers, cadre, or staff during BCT and AIT. Attrition rates were consistent with previous classes for these training companies. Although PSGs rated his Platoon, on average, as the lowest in their physical fitness and bearing, commitment and adjustment to the Army, support for peers, and peer leadership in the Tier l assessment, there was nothing to indicate his RA directly contributed to these lower ratings above the perfonnance of individual Soldiers. This data also showed his Platoon's overall average performance rating was comparahle to the mean for four Platoons within the AIT company. In addition, training observations, unit records, and interviews provided no evidence that his RA adversely impacted his or any of his peers' perfonnance during training.
When asked about his hesitancy to participate aggressively in combatives training during BCT, the RA Soldier indicated it was due to his concerns about being injured in training. He also indicated that if his turban was to come off during training, he would complete the training, then recover and retie his turban (and hair if needed). He also indicated he would view any deliberate attempt to grab or dislodge his turban as disrespectful and would ask for training to cease. Since this reaction to Comhatives training could be more unique to the Soldier's personality and individual preferences than reflecting the probable reactions of other Sikhs in the same situation, it is unclear how to interpret this finding within the context of a single case.
h. Health and safety: Based upon information gathered in the interviews and provided by the units, the Soldier's RA had no significant impact on his or any other Soldier's health and safety during BCT and AIT. The Soldier was able to prepare for each day in accordance with the approved accommodations in the same allotted time as his peers under barracks and field conditions. The Soldier's willingness to remove bis "kara" (plain metal bracelet worn on the 8 fOUO dominant am1/wrist) whenever needed minimized the risk of injury due to wearing a bracelet during training.
Acting on recommendations and guidance provided by Battalion (BN) and Brigade (BDE) leaders, based on information provided by one of the Sikh active duty officers later interviewed in this effort, the BCT company allowed the Soldier to use petroleum jelly to acquire a good seal on his ProMask during Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) training. No attempt was made to test if he could achieve an adequate seal in the chamber without using petroleum jelly. However, the Sikh officer originally providing the recommendations indicated in his interview that the M45 Pro Mask seals better than the M40, even without petroleum jelly being used.
Although he developed a rash that first appeared under his beard due to an allergic reaction during the AIT capstone field exercise, he was medically evaluated and treated for his condition, then approved to continue training. Reports indicated this was not an unusual event among Soldiers during this field exercise and the physical environment at Camp Bnl!is.
c. Unit cohesion, morale, good order and discipline: BCT and AIT unit leaders were proactive in informing their personnel about the RA Soldier and his accommodations prior to his arrival. This.created a level of understanding among Soldiers and cadre that facilitated his assimilation into the training units. His briefings at BCT and AlT were reportedly well received and very beneficial, as they addressed most initial reactions and curiosities Soldiers had about his situation and faith.
A BCT Drill Sergeant was disciplined in part for derogatory comments made regarding the Soldier's RA during a haircut formation. Following this incident, the company CDR met with the Soldier on a weekly basis until the completion of BCT. No other disciplinary actions directly or indirectly related to his RA were reported.
The only other incident that was reported by Soldiers within the BCT company was during the interviews. They described how derogatory comments were directed at the Soldier during Hispanic Heritage events by Soldiers and a few Drill Sergeants outside their BN. While highlighting potential issues when Soldiers with similar RA interact with a larger, less infom1ed base population, his peers' negative reaction to and correction of these Soldiers reflected a high degree of unit cohesion and morale within his company and Platoon. Many of the Soldiers described how they took advantage of opportunities to ask bim additional questions about his faith and background praised him for being open to questions, despite knowing he had to have been asked the same things over and over again. One group of female Soldiers (outside his Platoon) indicated they felt honored that their company was selected to have the RA Soldier in it for basic training.
Although not specified in the approved RA, Reception and training units allowed the Soldier to retain and wear his "kara". During his interview prior to graduating from AIT, the RA Soldier reported he also had a small ceremonial sword (kirpan), similar to a cham1 with no sharp edges, which he wore with his do!,> iags after returning from holiday leave. He assnmed it was appropriate based a conversation with his AIT Reception company command team and his approved RA, in addition to his observations that other Soldiers frequently wore a cross or other religious artifact with their dogtags.
The training units also approved his request for meditation time once a week (Sunday), although he normally attended a Sikh temple off post during AIT. His BCT unit also approved and supported his request to observe the Diwali ceremony on 5 November (during the capstone fi eld exercise, Victory Forge) requiring a few Sikh passages in Punjabi, approval for calling home and asking his mother to pray for him, and 6 candles to use during a 30 minute meditation (1 candle for each member of his family).
Additionally, there were three significant adjustments to training and normal training operations noted during BCT. First, a member of the company's leadership team arrived early at each training site to ensure civilian and military cadre were briefed about the Soldier's RA in order to minimize their initial reactions to his appearance. Next, although it required the cadre to adjust their manning for some training events, the unit had a Drill Sergeant escort the RA Soldier to any appointment outside the BN to ensure there was no overreaction to the Soldier's RA. Finally, as discussed earlier, the company allowed the Soldier to use petroleum jelly to acquire a good seal on his ProMask during CBRN training without attempting to determine if he could meet training standards and achieve an adequate seal in the chamber without using petroleum jelly.
The only significant adjustment to training noted during AIT was when "treated" for a head wound in the role of a casualty during AIT, bandages were secured over his turban rather than removing it. His field craft instructor indicated this did not significantly deviate from established standards and requirements. Based on the instructor's conclusion, it is not clear if this would present a unique health and safety issue should a Sikh Soldier experience such an injury in the field or in combat.
Based on training observations, information provided by the units, interviews, and analysis of data gathered through the Platoon Cohesion and Morale questionnaire and the Tier I assessment, the Soldier's religious accommodations did not have a significant impact on unit morale, cohesion, good order, and discipline. Without additional data indicating the accommodations granted to this Soldier were the primary reason his PLT was rated significantly below average on several of the ALQ and the Tier I assessments, it is not possible to clearly determine their exact and unique impact on the ratings.
While there were some reported reactions to his accommodations, especially by Soldiers outside his training companies, most seemed directly related to curiosity and misidentifying him as a Muslim based on his appearance and cultural stereotypes (i.e., only Muslims wear turbans and beards). This reaction is generally consistent with research examining the symbolism of variations in organizational dress and its impact on organizational identity (e.g. Pratt & Rafaeli, 1997), as these Soldiers could have been negatively reacting to the similarity of his appearance with well publicized images of our current adversaries than perceiving his dress and appearance as approved variations of Army standards. The dominant perspective gained from all sources was that the RA Soldier was generally treated the same as other Soldiers during training, other than the overt media interest in his situation.
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Limitations
While illuminating in many ways and one of the first systematic case studies conducted in the Anny that focused on the impact of religious accommodations, the critical fact is that this is a single case study. As with any case study, any consideration of tbe conclusions and recommendations emerging from this ef fort must remain cognizant of that restricted context. Combined with more extensive data, this ef fort could provide valuable insights into potential reactions and solutions for command teams facing the challenge of integrating Soldiers with similar accommodations.
Recommendations
A consistent point of emphasis raised in all command team, Drill Sergeant, and PSG interviews, was the importance of ensuring training personnel, cadre, staff, and Soldiers were well infonned. These individuals stressed that in addition to reviewing the approved RA and how they reflected other approved accommodations, it was essential to provide additional information on the Soldier's background and faith to ease his integration within the company and to minimize the potential for personnel to overreact to his appearance during this time of conflict. Based on the training company's feedback, having the Soldier personally brief the company in the beginning of BCT was especially effective in addressing many of their initial concerns about how other Soldiers would react. As the incident repmied during interviews with Soldiers from his BCT company suggests, consideration should be given to addressing how or if personnel outside the assigned unit should be in fonned about approved RA when they are expected to elicit reactions based on stereotyped threats or images of adversaries.
Interviews with officers, who had previously completed training with similar RA, as well as the RA Soldier, echoed the major themes from interviews with training personnel and Soldiers. It is important to emphasize that the Soldier will be treated no differently, other than allowing for his approved RA, during training. Based on their experiences, such RA should in no way impede a Soldier's ability to meet established Am1y standards. Although the Soldier, and his unit, should expect a great deal of understandable curiosity early in training or his assignment, this lessens over time as people become more accustomed to his appearance and informed about his background and the tenets of Sikhism.
During his interview, the RA Soldier also emphasized that other Sikhs considering joining the Army must be prepared for the challenges they will encounter in regards to their personal routines. They must not ovetTeact to the constraints placed on them and must learn to manage their time with the prescribed schedules, as there is sufficient time available to do what they need to do. However, given the Soldier's responses when questioned about his hesitancy during combatives training in BCT, it is also important that the training cadre and future Sikh Soldiers understand how they should react should their turban become dislodged, either accidentally or deliberately, during a training event, especially combatives.
Just as with other Soldiers, units should be prepared to address requests for accommodations for unique religious practices and observances. As the units were initially surprised by bis need to wear a bracelet (kara), future accommodations may need to be more specific to ensure required articles of faith, such as the kara and kirpin (sword), are identified and clarified if they will be allowed and in what form. Based upon this single case study, individuals receiving similar acconunodations must be willing to remove their kara voluntarily when needed for safety or training requirements. 
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Directions: This questionnaire will ask you to rate aspects of your overall initial military training experiences. Please fill in the circle that best reflects the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement. Your answers will be combined with the other Soldiers in your Platoon to develop an overall picture of your unit 
